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This paper examines the evolution and functioning of fiscal
decentralisation process and intergovernmental finance in the Republic
of South Africa (RSA). It analyses the system of dividing revenues
among the three spheres of government. The paper highlights the
challenges of designing and implementing intergovernmental fiscal
policies and institutions in the post-apartheid era.
The paper argues that the costed norms approach developed by
the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) has tremendous potential in
evolving a simple, objective, and fair system of transfers. However,
significant additional work in terms of research, its meaningful
dissemination to various governmental units, and building the information
system undertake the task is necessary to make it operational. The
absence of revenue equalisation in the transfer system is an important
weakness of the transfer design.  However, provinces do not have much
revenue powers. Revenue equalisation in the transfer formula is
meaningful only when some broad-based tax handles are assigned to
provinces. It is also an important moral and a policy question as to
whether there should be incentive to raise revenues from sources such
as, gambling taxes and hospital services.
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This note deals with the analysis of intergovernmental fiscal
system in the Republic of South Africa (RSA).  It examines the evolution
and functioning of the fiscal decentralisation process and analyses the
system of dividing national revenues between the three spheres of
government and effecting inter-se allocations within each of the three
spheres. The note also attempts to identify the strengths and
weaknesses of the system and highlights the challenges in designing
and implementing the fiscal decentralisation and transfer system in the
post-apartheid political regime. This examination is done keeping in the
background the principles of, and the best practices in fiscal
decentralisation intergovernmental fiscal system based on contemporary
experiences.
Of particular emphasis in the note is the system of making
vertical and horizontal division of national revenues.  It argues that the
“costed norms” approach to determining the division of revenues
recommended by the Fiscal and Finance Commission (FFC) is in the
right direction in terms of providing incentives and accountability and
holds tremendous promise.  The advantage of the approach lies in its
ability to take account of multiple factors impacting on expenditure needs
and cost disabilities of sub-national governments in providing public
services assigned to them. In contrast, the prevailing practice of
determining the allocations takes account of only selected and partial
indicators of need, involves judgments in terms of the factors chosen and
weights assigned. However, much more work needs to be done in terms
of both building a proper information system to help identify the
determinants of fiscal capacity and need and refining the methodology to
estimate them to minimise subjectivity in allocations.  Besides, it is also
important to bring in the incentive elements by linking revenue –
expenditure decisions at the margin in the transfer system. It is
necessary to ensure that while the revenue sharing system is simple and
formula based, it should be designed to address the principal objective of
the transfer system namely, offsetting fiscal disabilities arising from
deficiencies in revenue capacity and higher unit cost of providing public6
services in the case of general-purpose transfers and ensuring minimum
standards of services in the case of specific purpose transfers.
Analysis of the intergovernmental fiscal system in the RSA is
important for a variety of reasons.  First, the troubled history of apartheid
and the extreme inter-personal and inter-regional inequality and poverty
has underlined the importance of instituting an efficient and a fair fiscal
system. Second, fiscal decentralisation in RSA has been evolving
drastically in the post-apartheid period.  The large-scale reorganisation of
boundaries at both provincial and municipal levels since the new
constitution was adopted in 1996, and the change in the multilevel fiscal
organisation seen in the country is unique. Alongside reorganisation,
there has been a significant increase in the roles and responsibilities of
sub national governments in providing public services. This has brought
to the fore, the need to build institutional capacity for both raising
revenues and implementing expenditure decisions at provisional and
even more at municipal levels. Third, the fiscal arrangement involves
designing and implementing general purpose and specific purpose
transfer system. While the objective of the former is to provide
opportunities to the residents in various jurisdictions to exercise their
choices of public service levels and tax-prices, the latter should ensure
minimum levels of ‘meritorious’ services in all jurisdictions. Besides there
are non-economic objectives and that includes the nation-building role of
intergovernmental finance. Therefore, it is necessary that the system
should be objective, simple, and incentive compatible. In the post-
apartheid era, both policies and institutions are being calibrated de novo,
and the boundaries of the sub national governmental units are
substantially redrawn and therefore, it is necessary to ensure incentives
and accountability in the new system.
The design and implementation of the intergovernmental fiscal
system in the RSA poses a number of important challenges. The first is
to ensure delivery of essential public services to poorer households.
Chapter 2 of the constitution expands on ‘the Bill of Rights’ according to
which everyone should have access to adequate housing (section 26),
health care, food, water and social security (section 27), basic and
further education (section 29). It stipulates, “the State must take
reasonable measures, within its resources, to achieve progressive
realisation of each of these rights.” The second major challenge arises
from the redrawing of boundaries and significant organisational and
transaction costs of delivering public services that go with it.  Third, is of
building capacity at sub national levels.  This requires particular attention
in local areas, more specifically in non-metropolitan municipalities.
Equally important is the challenge of building a proper information
system to enable efficient and equitable design and implementation of7
national revenue allocation on the one hand, and prioritisation of public
service provision within each of the spheres on the other.
The paper is divided into five sections.  In the second section the
system of budgeting and intergovernmental fiscal arrangements
including the role of FFC in RSA is critically reviewed. In section 3,
challenges of designing appropriate general purpose and specific
purpose transfer systems are analysed in the light of prevailing vertical
and horizontal fiscal imbalances.  Section 4 deals with possible areas of
improvement and reform in designing and implementing the
intergovernmental fiscal system in RSA. Finally, concluding remarks are
summarised in the last section.
II. Intergovernmental Fiscal System in RSA
II.1. Assignment system:
South Africa has a unitary and yet, a highly decentralised system
of government with three spheres
1 of government – the national
government, nine provinces, and 284 local governments. The new
government after it came to power restructured the intergovernmental
system in keeping with the philosophy of ensuring equality of opportunity
in the post apartheid regime. The four white provinces and nine black
homelands were reorganised into nine provinces. Similarly, in 1995, local
governments were reorganised into 843 transitional municipalities by
combining the black and white areas and eventually in 2000, they were
consolidated into 284 local government units comprising of six one tiered
urban metropolitan governments, 232 primary municipalities falling under
46 district municipalities (Momoniat, 2002)
2. It is the political and
historical factors rather than purely fiscal considerations that have
shaped the organisation of intergovernmental fiscal system in RSA.
Assignment of functions to the three spheres of government is
done in the constitution itself. Accordingly, the national government looks
after the criminal justice system (police, justice, prisons), defence,
external affairs, higher education and such other functions with nation-
wide spillovers. It also provides social services such as school education,
health, welfare and housing concurrently with the provincial
governments. While the national government determines the policies8
relating to these sectors, the provinces implement these policies in terms
of actually providing the services. Provinces, in addition have the
responsibility of constructing and maintaining provincial roads.  Local
governments have the responsibility of providing electricity, water
sanitation, municipal administration, streets, streetlights, and garbage
collection.
In terms of revenue assignment, the fiscal system in RSA has
ruled in favour of fiscal uniformity, harmony and efficiency even as it
meant lower fiscal autonomy to subnational governments. All broad-
based taxes such as income and corporate taxes, VAT, excises, fuel levy
and customs are assigned to the national government.  Provinces can
levy minor levies such as gambling taxes, motor car licence fees, and
user fees on hospital services.  In terms of the constitution, they can levy
surcharge on personal income tax and fuel taxes but actually no province
levies them. The local governments have substantially higher tax powers
than provinces. Almost two-thirds of their expenditure requirements are
met by their own sources of revenues. They can levy property taxes,
turnover/payroll regional levies on businesses and user charges on
electricity and water.  Both provinces and local governments can borrow
for bridging purposes or for financing capital expenditures. The provinces
have borrowed only for bridging purposes mainly in the form of
overdrafts.  In the absence of national government guarantees, the local
governments have not been able to borrow.
II. 2.  Fiscal decentralisation:
The relative roles of the three spheres in raising revenues and
implementing expenditure decisions are presented in Table 1. It is seen
that provinces show overwhelming dependence on transfers. In 2001/02,
they raised only 1.3 per cent of total revenues raised at all spheres of
government and this could finance only about 3.2 per cent of their
expenditures. Thus, provinces depended on national transfer system to
finance about 97 per cent of their expenditures. In contrast, the local
governments raised 22 per cent of total revenues and their own
revenues could finance almost 79 per cent of their expenditures. The
remaining expenditures were financed from transfers (9.7 per cent) from
the national government and loans (11.5 per cent).9






















National 213.4 21.7 -115.2 73.7 100.0 78.46 28.83
Provincial 3.6 0 108.4 112.0 3.2 1.32 43.82
Local 55.0 8.0 6.8 69.8 78.8 20.22 27.31
total 272.0 29.7 0 255.6 100.0 100.0
* Excludes debt servicing of 46.2 Mill. Rands.
Note: Fiscal year for the national and provincial spheres is from April to
March whereas for the local level, from July to June.
The actual expenditure allocation for the assigned functions is
determined according to the targets and parameters determined by the
Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). Allocation is made
according to the three-year budget cycle consistent with the MTEF.  This
imparts a measure of stability to the budgeting process, enables a better
link between policy and budget formulation and helps in planning the
decisions on provision of public services better.  At the same time, the
multi-year budgeting brings in some degree of inflexibility and only
marginal changes in the year-to-year allocations are possible in such a
system.
The budget preparation involves vertical and horizontal division
of national revenues. The total revenues collected by the national
government net of debt servicing expenditures and contingency reserves
are divided between the three spheres according to political judgements.
The division of revenues between the spheres is done in terms of
providing equitable shares of national revenue to the provinces and local
governments and making conditional grants. Equitable shares of the
spheres is determined by the cabinet and in taking this decision, the
cabinet considers the recommendations of the Budget Council,
3 the
Budget Forum, the Ministers’ Committee on the Budget, the FFC and the
recommendations of the Inter-governmental Division of Revenue
Workshop. The prioritisation done in the MTEF provides the basis for the
division of revenues between the spheres.  Similarly conditional transfers
are given to provinces for identified purposes for the prioritised schemes.
There are seven schemes within the health sector mainly aimed at10
augmenting hospital facilities besides the integrated nutrition
programme.  There are two schemes in the education sector, three in
housing, a flood disaster reconstruction scheme, and some aimed at
augmenting the physical infrastructure and capacity building in financial
management.
Horizontal distribution of national revenues assigned to
provinces is determined on the basis of sets of factors laid down for
seven (7) different expenditure functions (Table 1).
4 The baseline
allocation to provinces as their distribution inter se has been done
according to the policy and priorities determined in the MTEF and any
changes in the allocation is possible only with additional resources if any,
available for distribution. As already mentioned, the baseline allocation
different provinces has already been done in the three year budget cycle
and changes are introduced from year to year to take account of new
information/data or any additional relevant considerations.
The equitable share from the national government to local
governments is determined according to the formula based on the extent
of poverty in the municipal areas. The basic package includes assistance
to meet the cost of providing water, sanitation, and other municipal
services for all households earning less than R, 800 per month. These
services are estimated to cost R. 80 per month/ household. The local
governments do not receive conditional transfers.
II.3. Financial and fiscal commission:
An important feature of the South African fiscal system is the
institution of Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC). The framework
document of the FFC (1995) defines the FFC as “an independent and
impartial statutory institution, accountable to the legislature, with the
objective of contributing towards the creation and maintenance of an
effective, equitable, and sustainable system of intergovernmental fiscal
relations, rendering advice to legislatures regarding any financial and
fiscal matter which has a bearing on intergovernmental fiscal relations.”11









2. Health 19 Proportion of population
without access to medical aid
3. Social security 17 Estimated number of persons
entitled to social security
payments (Old, disabled, and
children weighed with poverty
index derived from 1995
Income and expenditure
survey.
4. Basic share 7 Population share of the
province.
5. Backlog component 3 (i) Capital needs in
the school register
of needs
(ii) Audit of hospital
facilities
(iii) Share of rural
population.
6. Economic output component 8 Distribution of total
remuneration in the country
7. Institutional component 5 Equal division among
provinces
Source: Medium Term Budget Policy Statement, 2000. National
Treasury, Republic of South Africa.
The constitutional mandate for the FFC is to make
recommendations on:
¤ the system of sharing of revenues with the provinces;
¤ taxes, surcharges, and user charges to be imposed by provincial
governments;
¤ borrowing by provincial and local governments;
¤ guarantees of loans to the provinces.
Section 214 of the constitution provides for the enactment of
legislation to divide revenues equitably between national, provincial and
local spheres every year. The process, however, requires the
government to consult the FFC and Section 10(5) requires an12
explanatory memorandum in the Division of Revenue Bill to state how
the FFC’s annual recommendations have been taken account in the
revenue allocation.
The FFC, in its recommendation covering the period of MTEF
(2001-04), has adopted the “costed norms” approach to estimate
expenditure needs of provinces.  The cost of providing three basic
services namely, basic education, primary health care and social security
has been estimated using this approach. Normative cost of basic
education is estimated by taking into account the cost differentials for
different categories of actually enrolled students weighted with
judgements on their differential resource needs. Special adjustment is
made to reflect government’s deemed policy with respect to funding
inappropriate age learners.  In estimating the resource requirements for
primary health care, after taking the national per capita norms, cost
disability arising from poverty is separately taken account of.  The cost of
providing health care is estimated by taking account of need differences
due to different age and gender groups of population.  Here again, cost
disability due to poverty is taken account of. As regards welfare
payments, the number of eligible individuals in respect of each of the six
social security programs is taken into account and an administrative
component is added to the estimate.
In addition to the three sectors, the FFC also estimated the cost
of grant for all other services to be provided by the provinces and an
institutional component – minimum cost of operating government
institutions.  The FFC did not consider fiscal capacity equalisation grant
in its recommendations.
The government, however, has not accepted the
recommendations for a number of reasons. First, in a multi-year
budgeting framework within the MTEF, changing the methodology of the
transfer system mid-way could bring in an element of instability to the
budgets of sub national governments.  Second, the bottom up approach
implicit in the scheme is not considered appropriate to determine the
priorities. Political judgements and trade-offs have to be exercised.
Third, adopting costed norms approach to basic education, primary
health care and social security tends to impart bias against other
functions.  Fourth, although in principle, the FFC has suggested that the
approach can be used to make both vertical and horizontal distribution of
revenues, this is not possible at the present stage of conceptual clarity
and information availability.  Finally, the data requirements for practicable
application of the approach are enormous.13
II. 4. Costed norms approach: an evaluation:
There is much to be said in favour of the costed norms approach
that the FFC has applied and this certainly has the potential to be applied
more generally to evolve a more scientific approach to fiscal transfer
system in South Africa.  Before highlighting the merits of the approach, it
is useful to briefly point out the shortcomings of the approach currently
adopted to distribute national revenues to the provinces and
municipalities.
The major shortcoming in applying the approach at the present
stage is that there is no information on the various relevant factors
influencing expenditure needs for all the seven functions referred to
earlier.  Surely, some important factors have been considered, but these
are not the only cost factors beyond the control of provinces.  Each of the
seven functions is constituted by different components of public services
benefiting different target groups of population and therefore, standard of
public services will have to judged in relation to these target groups.  The
costed norms approach takes into account multiple factors affecting both
unit costs of the services provided and other factors affecting the quantity
and quality of public services.  The Australian Commonwealth Grants
Commission has successfully been estimating expenditure needs in
respect of a number of services provided in the states and the approach
has received general acceptance.
Methodological improvement in estimating expenditure needs
over the FFC’s approach lies in two areas. First, instead of taking the
cost disabilities exogenously based on judgements, it should be possible
to employ multiple factors affecting cost, and standards of public services
and take account of all cost factors which are beyond the control of
provinces estimate. Cost disability can be estimated on the basis of
actual expenditure differences in respect of individual functions across
different provinces. Second, norms can be developed on the basis of
actual expenditures by relating them to the factors affecting the quantity
and quality of public services. Developing the norms on the basis of
actual expenditure patterns has the advantage of being practicable for
the norms will be based on the average behaviour of the States.  The
FFC for example, considers poverty ratio or rural-urban population ratio
as cost disability factors.  It is possible to estimate cost disabilities based
on actual expenditures incurred and use these as weights rather than
making judgements on them.
 Estimation of expenditure needs by the Commonwealth Grants
Commission in Australia based on actual cost disability factors
5 is14
conceptually similar to the approach adopted by the Ninth Finance
Commission to estimate expenditure needs of the states in Indian
federation (India, 1990). In Indian context, states’ expenditures were
disaggregated into three categories:
¤ those which can be related to public service provision in terms of
cost, quantity and quality of public services;
¤ maintenance expenditures on items related to stock of assets
(road and building maintenance, maintenance of irrigation
works); and
¤ expenditure items that are purely random.
In the case of the first category, expenditure needs were
estimated by relating per capita expenditures of various services in
different States on cost, quantity and quality variables in cross section
regression equations.  Setting quantity and quality variables at normative
levels and taking actual cost, expenditure requirements for providing
normatively determined standards of services could be estimated.
Expenditure requirement in respect of the latter was estimated on the
stock of capital assets to be maintained. (expenditure on road
maintenance was estimated on the basis of length of various types of
roads).
Determining expenditure needs of states for education provides
a useful example.  In this case, the beneficiary age group of population,
teacher - student ratio, ratio of administrative personnel to teachers and
ratio of salary expenditures to total can be taken to represent the factors
affecting the standard of the service whereas, the salary differences of
teachers, density of population and urban-rural population ratio can be
taken to indicate cost differences. This approach can be extended to
cover a number of services.
6
The expenditure requirement of the second category of services
can be estimated by applying engineering norms. The example of this is
the maintenance expenditures on roads, irrigation works and buildings.
The third category of expenditure relates to items like disaster
relief.   In these cases, the average expenditure of the last few years in
real terms may be taken as norms.
The costed norms approach adopted by the FFC can be
improved on these lines.  There is a good scope to determine the norms15
using the regression analysis. As there are only nine (9) provinces, cross
section estimate will be constrained by inadequate degrees of freedom.
It is however, possible to overcome this problem by combining different
cross sections observations in a covariance model. Of course, the
approach is very data intensive and concerted efforts will have to be
made to build the information system. That would add to the quality of
decision-making and help in imparting greater objectivity to the transfer
system.
Building an information system is critical to estimating
expenditure requirements of local governments. The local government
structure is still evolving. Although on an average they raise about 80 per
cent of their expenditures, there are wide variations in the fiscal capacity
among the municipalities.  While the six metropolitan municipalities make
up more than 50 per cent of total municipal budget and 20 biggest
municipalities claim 80 per cent, most of the municipalities are very small
with budgets less than R 100 million (Momoniat, 2002). Building a proper
information system on the standards of municipal services, tax bases,
own revenues including taxes and user charges is critical to developing
an appropriate approach and methodology for determining the
expenditure needs of municipalities.
III.  Designing Intergovernmental Transfers
III.1.  Conceptual issues:
The foregoing discussion on the intergovernmental fiscal system
brings out a number of shortcomings of the transfer system in RSA.
First, there is overwhelming dependence of provinces on the transfer
system as they have hardly any revenue raising powers. Thus
unconditional transfer is designed not to deal with offsetting revenue
disabilities, but simply attempts to provide resources to meet the
expenditure needs. Similarly, conditional transfers do not require
matching contributions from the recipient.  The total lack of link between
revenue-expenditure decisions has both adverse incentives and
accountability. At the municipal level, even though they have revenue
raising powers, poor information inhibits evolving a scientific transfer
system. While the FFC’s attempt to develop the ‘costed norms’ approach
is a significant improvement over the prevailing methodology, much16
needs to be done to evolve a transfer system that will promote equity,
efficiency, and at the same time is incentive compatible.
This section deals with the conceptual issues of designing the
transfer system in RSA, keeping in the background the principles of
intergovernmental transfers and some of the best practices available.
The emphasis is on evolving a conceptually a sound system of transfers
to offset vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances at both provincial and
local spheres and to ensure minimum standards of meritorious services
in them.
In the literature, arguments for general purpose transfers are
made on horizontal equity grounds (Boadway and Flatters, 1982).
Accordingly, economic objective of general purpose transfers is seen as
enabling the sub national governmental units to provide a given
normative bundle of public services at a given tax-price. Thus, the
residents of various jurisdictions, irrespective of their location are able to
receive their comparable bundle of public services by paying comparable
tax rates.
Violation of horizontal equity in a multilevel fiscal system arises
because of revenue and cost differences among different jurisdictions.
While in some systems, the existence of origin based tax system can be
a source of horizontal inequity, the principal reason for inequity is the
differences in fiscal capacity among the jurisdictions. Thus, a poorer
jurisdiction has to levy higher tax rates on its residents to provide the
level of public services provide by its richer counterpart. To enable it to
provide the same bundle at uniform tax rate, Central transfers would be
necessary.
Another source of horizontal inequity arises from the differences
in the unit cost of providing public services.  If cost differences are due to
factors within the control of sub national jurisdictions, there is no need to
offset them.  However, when cost differences are due to factors beyond
their control, it is necessary to offset these differences through
intergovernmental transfers. Thus, the objective of unconditional
transfers is to offset the differences in fiscal capacity and unit cost of
providing public services due to factors beyond the control of sub
national jurisdictions.
III. 2.  Lessons from experience:
In actual practice, however, there are very few countries that
have designed unconditional transfers to offset revenue and cost17
disabilities.  The closest to this ideal is in Australia where the relative
shares of the states are determined on the basis of ‘relativities’ estimated
by taking into account both revenue and cost disabilities.  The
equalisation payment in the Canadian transfer system only attempts to
offset differences in fiscal capacity.  The normative standard is set at the
average of five-province capacity excluding the province of Alberta (high
income with significant oil revenues) and the poorer eastern provinces.
Among the developing countries, Indian transfer system comprises
central tax devolution and giving grants to states. The distribution of
central tax revenues to states is not done according to direct measures
of revenue and cost disabilities, but the formula includes the factors that
are assumed to be determinants of capacities and needs of the states
such as population, per capita income and area.
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III. 3. Designing a transfer system in RSA: important issues
There are significant differences among the provinces in terms of
their economic characteristics to case variations in the ability to raise
taxes, even from the few handles assigned to them.  At one extreme is
the province of Gauteng with the highest mean monthly household
expenditure (R. 4270), which is over 2.5 times the expenditure in the
poorest province of Eastern Cape.  Gauteng also has the highest human
development index, lowest poverty ratio and highest degree of
urbanisation.  As in the case of mean monthly household expenditures
there are significant variations in human development index, urbanisation
as well as poverty ratio among provinces.  This implies that there are
significant differences in the ability to raise revenues among the
provinces.
A major shortcoming of the transfer system in RSA is that it does
not consider the revenue side of the provinces or municipalities in its
design and takes account of the estimates of ‘expenditure needs’ for the
assigned functions in its design of unconditional transfers.  The principal
reason for this is that provinces do not have much revenue raising
powers. The provinces can raise revenues from only from motorcar
licence fees, betting taxes in casinos and horseracing, and hospital fees.
Although they have the power to levy surcharge on the national income
tax, they have not exercised this power.  Unless provinces are assigned
more important tax powers, it does not make much sense to design the
transfer system to offset fiscal capacity differences. To that extent,
inequities arising from fiscal capacity differences among provinces will
continue.18
It is important to explore additional revenue handles for
provinces in South Africa to augment their own revenue raising capacity.
Linking revenue raising and expenditure decisions at the margin is
important for reasons of efficiency and accountability. Unless the
provinces raise substantial part of the revenues to finance public
services provided by them, they may not get a sense of ownership and
accountability to the taxpayers. Of course, there could be a trade off
between fiscal autonomy and efficiency in the tax system. And the
decision to provide additional tax powers to provinces should be weighed
against the possible efficiency loss due to tax competition and
disharmony. Perhaps incentive should be provided to the provinces to
levy surcharge on income tax. Another possible source is a piggyback
levy on VAT.  In terms of the new tax handle, a possible source that may
be assigned to provinces is stamp duty on transfer of property.
Table 3: Selected Economic Indicators of Provinces













Western Cape 88.9 3816 0.12 0.727
Northern Cape 68.8 2396 0.35 0.648
Free State 70.5 1819 0.48 0.650
Eastern Cape 33.2 1702 0.48 0.603
KwaZulu Natal 46.3 2579 0.26 0.623
Mpurnalanga 40.3 2394 0.25 0.626
Northern Province 11.6 1855 0.38 0.566
Gauteng 96.5 4270 0.12 0.727
North West 36.6 2137 0.37 0.615
South Africa 53.9 - 0.672
Source: Intergovernmental Fiscal Review, 2000, Republic of South Africa
– National Treasury, October, 2000.19
Even with the prevailing assignment system, it would be useful to
develop the information system and appropriate methodology for
estimating the taxable capacity of provinces. The representative tax
system approach could be employed to estimate the relative taxable
capacity effort. The data requirements for employing this methodology
include information on the tax bases or their proxies and revenue from
each of the sources. Australian and Canadian federations have done
considerable work in estimating revenue capacity and effort in these
federations and it should be possible to adopt this with appropriate
modifications to take into account the nature of the taxes levied and
information availability.
Another issue relevant for discussion at the provincial level
relates to the conditional transfers. At present, as the provinces do not
have adequate tax powers, entire spending requirement of the selected
functions is given by way of transfers.  It may be necessary to incentives
the conditional transfer system by requiring matching contributions from
the provinces. Even if the matching requirement is kept at 10-15 per cent
of the cost of the scheme, it would provide incentives to raise revenues
and provide a sense of ownership and participation in the service
delivery.
III. 4. Fiscal capacity differences among municipalities:
As mentioned earlier, in contrast to provinces, the municipalities
have significant powers to raise their own revenues from property taxes,
turnover/payroll levies on businesses and user charges on electricity and
water provided to the residents. The municipalities raise almost 20 per
cent of total revenue collections in the country and this finances 78 per
cent of their expenditures.
It appears, fiscal capacity differences between municipalities are
much more than between the provinces. This is natural, given the
troubled history of the country and race segregation that went with the
apartheid regime.  Although attempts have been made to restructure the
municipalities combining the previously demarcated black and white
areas, the six metropolitan municipalities account for more than 50 per
cent of the aggregated local budget and the twenty biggest municipalities
account for 80 per cent. Most municipalities are very small with budgets
less than R 100 million.20
Unfortunately, paucity of information makes it difficult to get a
clear picture of fiscal capacity differences, the structure and operation of
property taxes and ability of the municipalities to collect proper user
charges on electricity and eater supply from the consumers.  Nor is there
any information on differences in institutional capacity to administer taxes
and provide public services.  It is extremely important collect information
on taxes, user charges and the value of the tax bases to understand the
degree of horizontal imbalances among the municipalities in RSA.
As mentioned earlier, conceptually, it is important to offset both
revenue and cost disabilities in designing a proper transfer system at
both provincial and municipal spheres.  This calls for building up proper
information system required to estimate differences in fiscal capacity and
cost disabilities across different provinces and municipalities. The
standard methodology available for estimating fiscal policy can be
modified to apply to particular situation obtaining in RSA.  However, the
viability of any approach ultimately depends on the availability of quality
information on various tax bases and variables representing cost and
standards of public services on the other.
V. Concluding Remarks
The shaping of intergovernmental system and fiscal
arrangements between the three spheres of government in RSA is at an
important stage of evolution.  The drastic measures have been taken to
restructure the boundaries and provide meaningful roles to sub national
levels of government in the provision of public services.  It is important to
evolve a simple, fair, objective and equitable system of
intergovernmental fiscal arrangements to enable the system to play the
critical role of nation building in RSA. The paper has attempted to identify
a number of important issues that should be addressed in the short and
medium term to enable the intergovernmental fiscal system to play such
a constructive role.  These are summarised in the following:
¤ The costed norms approach developed by the FFC has
tremendous potential in evolving a simple, objective and fair
system of transfers. This is distinctly superior to the prevailing
approach to distributing transfers. However, significant additional
work in terms of research and building the information system
should be undertaken to make it operational.21
¤  It is possible to evolve the norms on the basis of existing
information instead of making normative judgements.  Of course,
judgements are unavoidable in any normative schemes of
transfers, developing the norms based on the actual fiscal values
will make evaluation based on the relative performances rather
than externally imposed judgements.
¤ An important pre-requisite for adopting the costed norms
approach and extending it to assess the expenditure
requirements of municipalities is the building of reliable
information system. The data requirements for this is enormous
and concerted effort must be made to identify and collect data
relating to general economic, demographic conditions as well as
tax bases and service levels in different provinces and
municipalities.  Building of information system is critical to
evolving a scientific and acceptable methodology for evolving
intergovernmental transfer system.
¤ The absence of revenue equalisation component in the transfer
system has taken the attention away from the need to augment
revenues at sub national spheres. Revenue equalisation is
necessary not only for creating a building in proper incentive
structure in the transfer system but also to ensure better
accountability to voters and to avoid the ‘free-riding’ problem.  It
is also necessary to identify additional sources of revenue to the
provinces so that their reliance on the transfers is reduced to
forge a better linkage between revenue and expenditure
decisions.
¤ There is a need to consolidate conditional transfers by identifying
clear goals and targets. It may also be appropriate to incentives
the conditional transfers by requiring matching contributions from
recipient governments.  At present, most of the conditional
transfers are in the health sector or for infrastructure
development. Given the significant poverty levels in particularly
poorer municipalities, it may be necessary to evolve direct anti-
poverty interventions through specific purpose transfers on the
lines of “food for work” program.22
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End Notes
1 The vertical division of the intergovernmental system is made in terms
of “spheres” rather than tiers to denote that the levels are distinct
governments – each accountable to its elected legislature or council.
See, Republic of South Africa (2001).
2 For an interesting account of the transitional issues, see, Ahmad
(1998).
3 Budget Council is constituted by the national and provincial ministers of
finance.  Budget Forum consists of members of Budget Council and the
national and provincial chairpersons of local government associations.
4 The formula involving the 10 factors were adopted based on the
recommendation of the Financial and Fiscal Commission in 1996.
5 See Rye and Searle (1997).
6 There can be problems of endogeneity of explanatory variables and
single equation models may be biased.  But it should be possible to
estimate the needs based on simultaneous equation models.   It would
be useful to estimate the equation using both approaches and see the
differences in the need estimates.  Single equation approach has the
advantage of simplicity.
7 For a critical analysis of Indian transfer system, see, Rao (2002).